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Introduction 
The notion that worklessness is immoral was inherent in the English Poor Law’s 
tradition of setting the poor to work. While the causes of unemployment are no 
longer regarded as confined to or even primarily derived from personal moral fail-
ure – since structural factors to do with economic changes and the demand for la-
bour, particularly diversely skilled labour, are acknowledged to be the principal 
causes – the idea that being in employment is a personal responsibility retains a 
continuing influence over social security provision for the unemployed. Indeed, it is 
reflected in the growing individualisation of the relationship between the state and 
unemployed citizen, as part of the managerialistic governance of welfare that places 
an emphasis on strict controls with contractual underpinnings.  
This is certainly true of the principal benefit for those out of work in the UK to-
day, the jobseeker’s allowance (JSA). In essence JSA is a simple benefit, providing 
contribution-based entitlement during the first six months of unemployment and 
thereafter (or from the first day, if the insurance contribution record is inadequate) 
means-tested entitlement of unlimited duration. This benefit replaced unemploy-
ment benefit (UB) in 1996. Like UB and the benefits that preceded it, dating back 
to the National Insurance Act 1911, one of the principal conditions of entitlement is 
that of being “available for employment”. Since 1989 claimants have also had to be 
“actively seeking employment”, but there is a basic continuity in the principles of 
social security law relating to this area. However, over the past two decades the 
conditionality of this benefit has increased, in two main areas: first, in the require-
ments concerned with worksearch, some of which are now linked to specific gov-
ernment schemes for arranged work and training (under various “New Deal” pro-
grammes); and secondly, in the sanctions that must or may be applied to those who 
do not take up employment or participate in activation measures, which are under-
scored by the terms of an express agreement between jobseeker and government 
agency.  
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These developments are part of a broader “welfare to work” strategy that the 
UK Government has been pursuing over the past 10 years and which is now tar-
geted not only at those claiming JSA but also those perceived to have a looser at-
tachment to the labour market due to sickness, disability or family responsibilities. 
It is linked to a wider employment policy which is based around the aim of achiev-
ing an 80% employment rate – in other words, that 80% of the population of work-
ing age should be in employment and that the 20% who are not should made up ex-
clusively of “those who have a good reason to be outside the labour market”, 
namely people who have retired early, have full-time caring responsibilities or who 
have a severe disability or illness that makes them incapable of work (HCWPC: 
paras 19 and 20). Since 1971, the social security system has also tried to incentivize 
the take-up of employment through the provision of means-tested in-work benefits 
or, since 1999, tax credits, so that the prospect of low wages does not deter people 
from moving from benefit to work.  
This chapter examines the continuities and changes in social security law that 
have shaped the current system of benefits for the unemployed. It explains how the 
underlying ideologies and perceived social and economic imperatives have im-
pacted upon the developing legal and policy framework. It highlights ways in 
which the policies that have been implemented, particularly in recent years, have 
interacted with long-standing principles within social security law, such as the no-
tion of ‘voluntary unemployment’.  
From Poor Relief to the ‘Labour Exchange’ and Unemploy-
ment Insurance 
Activation strategies have a long history in the UK. They can be traced back to the 
Elizabeth Poor Law, which adopted the principle of setting the poor to work as a 
condition for relief. As early as the Poor Relief Act 1576 there was a local duty to 
provide materials for the able-bodied poor to work (Fraser 1984, 32). The Poor 
Law Act of 1601 continued the principle of providing and requiring work for the 
able bodied within each parish, including children whose parents could not support 
them, while maintaining a harsh regime of accommodating the incapable poor in 
almshouses or “poor-houses” and sending those considered to be capable of work 
but unwilling to engage in it to “houses of correction”, a form of punishment. 
While it is not necessary to recount the history of the Poor Law, it is important to 
reflect on the underlying philosophy of self-support and the deterrence of idleness 
that underpinned it, since it has had a continuing influence on social security and is 
even reflected in many of the central provisions of the modern law. 
The Poor Law still offered the principal form of poverty relief for the unem-
ployed by the turn of the 20th Century, a time when unemployment was growing. 
In London, “distress committees” provided assistance to unemployed workers 
(Beveridge 1930). Bureaucratic control had been and remained a feature of the 
 From Unemployment to Active Jobseeking 51 
 
 
 
Poor Law administration, but by registering and classifying the unemployed and 
investigating their circumstances the distress committees of early 20th Century 
London were perhaps a precursor to the strict administrative controls of later years. 
The distress committees were established under the Unemployed Workmen Act of 
1905, a year which also marked the establishment of the Royal Commission on the 
Poor Law. When this Commission reported in 1909 there were Majority and Mi-
nority Reports. While they disagreed on the subject of how much state involvement 
in welfare provision was desirable or needed, the reports agreed on two fundamen-
tal mechanisms: the introduction of a national scheme of unemployment insurance 
and the establishment of labour exchanges, which were places where the unem-
ployed could register their interest in employment and might be found work. The 
exchanges in fact preceded the unemployment insurance scheme, although they be-
came inextricably linked. The Labour Exchanges Act 1909 gave the Board of 
Trade, a government ministry, a power to establish and maintain labour exchanges 
in locations where they were needed and empowered the making of regulations 
concerning the management of exchanges, which were later known as employment 
exchanges. The exchanges maintained separate registers for adult and juveniles. 
The numbers registering doubled once the unemployment insurance scheme which 
was introduced in 1912 under the National Insurance Act 1911 made registration 
for work at an exchange a necessary condition of entitlement for unemployment 
benefit (Gilbert 1966, 262). However, only unemployment from a limited number 
of prescribed trades was covered by the scheme (see below). 
Two particular features of the scheme of unemployment benefit under the 1911 
Act have come to represent continuities in this area of social security law. These 
elements were not only present in the unemployment insurance scheme, which was 
a contributory scheme, but were later to also become features of the principal social 
assistance scheme, known as unemployment assistance. The first of the features 
was a basic test as to whether or not continuing unemployment was preventable – a 
work-test condition. The second comprised a penalty for those whose unemploy-
ment was avoidable. Under the work test condition (in section 86(3) of the National 
Insurance Act 1911), the claimant could only secure entitlement to benefit if “capa-
ble of work but unable to obtain suitable employment”. The penalty comprised a 
period of disqualification for benefit of six weeks where the unemployment arose 
from “misconduct” or the claimant “voluntarily [left] his employment without just 
cause” (section 87).  
These features of unemployment insurance, its contributory basis and the fact 
that the scheme was limited to particular trades such as sawmilling and shipbuild-
ing where unemployment was cyclical and therefore largely short term, reflected 
the actuarial basis to the scheme. The work test and disqualification period helped 
to protect the collective insurance fund against unwarranted claims in the same way 
that avoidable losses (or losses capable of mitigation) would not be compensated 
(or fully compensated) under commercial insurance arrangements. The 1920s saw 
the gradual extension of the unemployment insurance scheme to cover more trades, 
provide benefit of longer duration and make provision for claimants’ dependants. In 
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addition, new schemes such as “extended benefit” were introduced for those who 
had exhausted their entitlement to unemployment benefit. Later, there was “transi-
tional benefit” for people who could not meet all the contribution conditions (Fraser 
1984, 187). Despite the increasing generosity of the unemployment insurance 
scheme, the conditions of entitlement remained tight and were intensified in re-
sponse to continuing concern to avoid abuse. 
The Unemployment Insurance Act 1920 embodied the notion of availability for 
work, which remains a condition of entitlement today. The above-mentioned work 
test condition became, under the 1920 Act (section 7(1)(iii)), one of being “capable 
of and available for work, but unable to obtain suitable employment” (emphasis 
added). However, the disqualification period in respect of voluntary employment 
ceased to be a fixed period of six weeks. Instead an element of officer discretion 
was introduced: it became “six weeks or such shorter period being not less than one 
week…” (section 8(2)). The work test condition was further tightened up just one 
year later when the proportionment of benefits to contributions – which it was as-
sumed would prevent abuse, as “the malingerer… could only cheat himself since 
unnecessary claims would reduce entitlement to benefit when it was really needed” 
(Fraser 1984, p 187) – was abandoned. Thus the Unemployment Insurance Act 
1921 provided that “No person shall be entitled to benefit… unless he proves that 
he is… genuinely seeking whole-time employment but unable to obtain such em-
ployment” (section 3(3)). Therefore mere availability for work was insufficient. 
The claimant now had to be “genuinely seeking” it and had the onus of proving that 
he or she was doing so. A further amendment, made by Unemployment Insurance 
(No 2) Act 1924 (section 3) confirmed two separate conditions related to this work 
test: first, the claimant had to be “capable of and available for work” and, secondly, 
had to be “genuinely seeking work but unable to obtain suitable employment”.  
Significant numbers of claims were refused as a consequence of the more oner-
ous conditions from 1921. According to Fraser (1984, 188), in the period from 
March 1921 to March 1930, three million claims were turned down for failure to 
meet the “genuinely seeking work” condition. There is an interesting contrast with 
the less strict work test condition that was attached to “extended benefit” (the bene-
fit for those who had exhausted their entitlement to unemployment benefit) when 
entitlement to it was made of unlimited duration in 1924. The claimant was entitled 
to the extended benefit if, among other things, “he is making every reasonable ef-
fort to obtain employment suited to his capacities and is willing to accept such em-
ployment” (Unemployment Insurance (No 2) Act 1924, section 1(3)(d), emphasis 
added). Extended benefit was later replaced via the Unemployment Insurance Act 
1927 by a means-tested and discretionary benefit known as “transitional benefit”, 
noted above, which later became “transitional payment”. It was replaced in 1934 by 
“unemployment assistance” – the forerunner of successive means-tested assistance 
schemes: “(national) assistance” (1948-66), “supplementary benefit” (1966-87) and 
the two current schemes, “income support” (1987-) and “income-based jobseeker’s 
allowance” (1996-date). 
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The “genuinely seeking work” condition of entitlement to unemployment bene-
fit was abolished under section 6 of the Unemployment Insurance Act 1930. It had 
been considered to be well nigh impossible to prove “genuineness” (Lundy 2000, 
302). Such a test was not to reappear until nearly 60 years later (below). The 1930 
Act also increased basic rates of benefit and has been viewed as the most generous 
of the unemployment insurance measures before economic slump and mass unem-
ployment forced the Government into cutting benefits and tightening conditions of 
entitlement, leading to some one million claimants being excluded from entitlement 
(Davison 1938, 8, 15; see Harris 2000, 81-82). Nonetheless, the 1930 Act intro-
duced some further work test conditions which are still with us today. Indeed, to-
day’s social security lawyers in the UK would instantly recognise the terminology 
employed in section 4 of the Act. This provided for disqualification from benefit 
“for a period of six weeks or for such shorter period and from such date as may be 
determined by a court of referees or the umpire” where the claimant: (i) had “with-
out good cause” refused or failed to apply for a vacancy notified to him by an em-
ployment exchange or other recognised agency; or (ii) had  
“without good cause refused or failed to carry out any written directions given to 
him by an officer of an employment exchange with a view to assisting him to find 
suitable employment (being directions which were reasonable having regard 
both to both the circumstances of the claimant and to the means of obtaining that 
employment usually adopted in the district…)”.  
These tighter conditions remained despite the extensions to provision that occurred 
as national economic conditions improved. 
The Poor Law idea of “setting the poor on work” was not adopted. But although 
there was no inter-war equivalent of the New Deal programmes introduced by the 
post-1997 Labour Government, there were industrial transference schemes under 
which unemployed workers were in effect compelled to move from areas of labour 
surplus into those where work was available (Harris 2000, 80-81). Under the Un-
employment Insurance Acts of 1920 and 1930, juveniles could be required to attend 
a course at an instruction centre or face disqualification from benefit. Subsequently, 
in exploring ways in which work incentives might be maintained, William 
Beveridge proposed not only the maintenance of a gap between basic benefits and 
wages, but also the discouragement of idleness through benefit sanctions, which 
were already a feature of the unemployment insurance scheme, and requirements to 
attend courses of training as a condition of receipt of benefit. The Beveridge Re-
port, which formed the blueprint for the UK’s welfare state which was developed 
after the second world war, argued that safeguards were needed in case “men… set-
tle down to” life on benefits; it proposed attendance at a work or training centre for 
six months (Beveridge 1942, para 131), although in the event this reform was not 
implemented because it was considered impracticable.  
However, both the work test that was attached to the basic conditions of enti-
tlement and the six weeks’ maximum disqualification continued on into the Na-
tional Insurance Act 1946 that embodied the social insurance reforms proposed in 
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the Beveridge Report. As the insurance and assistance schemes evolved, these fea-
tures were present within both of them. There was a requirement on the claimant to 
register as available for work, a requirement that did not for example apply to 
women caring for a child or persons who were physically or mentally incapable of 
work. This is important, as the same basic work test conditions applied to all unem-
ployed claimants apart from those exempt from them. Insurance benefits declined 
in importance particularly by the 1960s and 1970s (Wikeley 1989) because they 
were not sufficiently up-rated and because unemployment became more long term 
and increasing numbers of young people who had no insurance contributions 
claimed benefit on leaving school. These factors led to an increasing demand for 
means-tested (and non-contributory) assistance, known by then as supplementary 
benefit, and a much reduced demand and qualification for insurance-based unem-
ployment benefit. 
So we can see that in the period from the National Insurance Act 1911 until the 
Unemployment Act 1934 the basic framework was established and that despite 
some changes, including the extension of the maximum disqualification period, its 
features represent an important continuity in social security law. However, although 
unemployment in the UK in January 2008 stood at exactly the same level as in 
1935, at 1.6 million (Ministry of Labour Gazette, December 1935, 480; 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=12 (accessed 26 March 2008)), 
those claiming benefit today face much tougher work test conditions, linked to sig-
nificant administrative controls. So, moving on from the continuities, what transi-
tions have occurred, and why? 
Tightening the screw – the Conservatives’ reforms post-1979 
By the 1980s there was perceived to be crisis in the welfare state in the UK. The 
benefit system had become unsustainably expensive, overly complex and con-
demned for stifling individual endeavour. These problems were anathema to a 
Government committed to monetarist economic policy and a neo-liberal approach 
to state welfare. According to the Conservative Governments’s policy document 
(Green Paper) on social security reform in 1985, social security had “lost its way” 
(HM Government 1985, Vol 1, para 1). The Conservatives, who had been returned 
to power in 1979, instituted a review of the social security system. However, it was 
principally concerned with means-tested benefit, especially supplementary benefit 
and housing benefits, which were the most complex and expensive to administer. 
Essentially the basic general conditions of entitlement to unemployment benefit 
were not affected by the proposed changes that resulted from this review. However, 
the Social Security Act 1986 effected an increase in the maximum period of dis-
qualification for ‘voluntary’ unemployment and related matters (above) from six to 
13 weeks. The Secretary of State for Social Security was also given a power by the 
Act to increase this period using delegated legislation. It was not long before the 
power was exercised. In 1988 the maximum disqualification period was extended 
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to 26 weeks, where it remains. However, the Secretary of State had and continued 
to have (Social Security Act 1989, section 12(2), Jobseeker’s Act 1995, section 
19(3)) no power to increase it beyond 26 weeks, it can only be reduced unless Par-
liament votes otherwise. There was, however, no tightening up in the basic avail-
ability for work condition, save for the introduction of limitations which claimants 
were permitted to place on their availability (see Wikeley 2002, p 341). These limi-
tations were greatly increased once JSA was introduced in 1996/97 (see below).  
There was a return to the idea that the law should place some onus on the 
claimant not merely to indicate availability for work but also a sincere intention to 
obtain it. Previously, as noted above, claimants had had to show they were “genu-
inely seeking work”. Under the Social Security Act 1989 (section 10) that condition 
was effectively reintroduced through a requirement to be “actively seeking em-
ployed earner’s employment”. The Act also enabled the “steps which a person is 
required to take in any week if he is to be regarded as actively seeking employed 
earner’s employment in that week” (section 10) to be prescribed by regulations. 
Concerns were, however, expressed that the new condition was demeaning, since 
those who remained unemployed despite seeking work would regularly be con-
fronted with their own demoralising sense of failure (Buck 1989). They were also 
considered to be harsh given the paucity of job opportunities, the extent of unem-
ployment at the time and the unreliability of the evidence cited by the Government 
to confirm that claimants in general made inadequate efforts in the search for a job 
(Wikeley 1989).  
In 1990, when Parliament was debating a new Social Security Bill, an unsuc-
cessful attempt was made by an opposition MP to have the “actively seeking” work 
condition abolished, on the grounds that it was unfair and was designed to depress 
wage levels by forcing the unemployed to accept low paid work (House of Com-
mons Debates, 3 April 1990, col 1086), a charge which in fact is less potent today 
in view of the introduction of the minimum wage in the late 1990s. It was reported 
that in the first seven weeks after the implementation of the Social Security Act 
1989, 700 unemployment claimants per week were being given written warnings 
about their job-seeking activities and nearly 600 of them “subsequently had their 
benefit suspended when their claims were referred to adjudication officers” 
(col.1088). The Government confirmed that between 9 October 1989 and 26 Janu-
ary 1990, 11,400 claimants were issued with warning letters for failing to seek 
work actively, and that there was “a rising trend in the number of claimants warned 
about inadequate job search” (col 1093, Mrs G Shephard MP, Under-Secretary of 
State). Approximately 15% of the claimants who were warned had to be referred to 
adjudication officers for consideration of disallowance (col.1093). 
By this stage the Government could point to the development of training and 
employment assistance programmes, both for adults and specifically for young 
people (Harris 1989). Among these was the Youth Training Scheme (YTS). Young 
people leaving school and finding themselves unable to secure employment did not 
have the contributions record to enable them to qualify for unemployment benefit, 
but they could qualify for means-tested supplementary benefit. However, if they 
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unreasonably refused or failed to avail themselves of a training place on the YTS 
they faced a 40% reduction in their weekly benefit. In the nine months from De-
cember 1983-September 1984 over 10,000 young people were subjected to this re-
duction on the grounds of non-participation in the YTS (House of Commons De-
bates, Vol 69, cols 165-166, 4 December 1984). The Government went one impor-
tant stage further in the Social Security Act 1988, when it raised the minimum age 
of entitlement to social security for most claimants from 16 to 18 (see Harris 1988).  
For older people there was the Employment Training programme, which paid 
an allowance marginally higher than the relevant rate of benefit. Under the Social 
Security Act 1975 (section 20) those who refused to participate in training ap-
proved for the claimant by the Secretary of State faced benefit disqualification. 
Eventually training was covered by a number of separate disqualification grounds, 
introduced by the Employment Act 1988 (section 27), and later consolidated in 
1992 legislation (Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, s 28), re-
lated to failing to apply for or take up a training place, voluntarily leaving a training 
place or losing one’s place due to misconduct. In most cases there was a defence of 
having “good cause” for the action or inaction in question. As with the employ-
ment-related grounds of disqualification, those who claimed basic assistance 
(which from 1987 changed from supplementary benefit to “income support”) dur-
ing the period of disqualification were also subjected to a reduction in the rate of 
this benefit. The reduction, amounting to 40% of the personal allowance element of 
the benefit, ensured that the disqualification had “a financial bite” (Mesher and 
Wood 1995, p 126).  
So, by the early 1990s there was in place a detailed and wide-ranging statutory 
regime for the enforcement of worksearch and availability for work. There was 
once again a test to be satisfied of being actively engaged in the search for em-
ployment, although as Lundy points out, it had already been held that the basic test 
of availability for work implied “some active step by the [claimant] to draw atten-
tion to his availability” (Commissioner’s Decision R(U)5/80, para 14, cited in 
Lundy 2000, n.60). Although some of disqualification grounds required an absence 
of “good cause” – for example, for failing to apply for a position notified to the 
claimant – the factors that should be taken into account in determining “good 
cause” were tightly defined by the regulations, as amended in 1989; a person could 
not, for example, normally claim that travel to work time constituted good cause 
unless it was more than one hour each way (Social Security (Unemployment, Sick-
ness etc) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1598), reg 12E). Disqualification could now 
be imposed for up to 26 weeks and the grounds on which it could be instituted had 
been extended to include participation in training programmes.  
The Jobseekers Act 1995 and activation  
The most recent legislative reform of real significance occurred in 1996 with the 
introduction of jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) under the Jobseekers Act (JA) 1995. 
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The current framework is still based around this Act. JSA combines two separate 
schemes: (1) Contribution-based JSA (CBJSA), which replaced unemployment 
benefit; and (2) Income-based JSA (IBJSA), which replaced income support (but 
only for those who are required to be available for work) and which, like income 
support, is a means-tested benefit. Approximately 80% of the people entitled to 
JSA received IBJSA, since individual entitlement to CBJSA runs for only six 
months and once it is exhausted a claimant will in effect be forced to seek enti-
tlement to IBJSA, as will a person who does not meet the contributions require-
ment for CBJSA.  
As Lundy explains, “JSA was introduced with the express intention of rein-
forcing the link between the receipt of social security and the search for work” 
(Lundy 2000, 291). The notion of an obligation to work that underpins JSA may 
be in furtherance of traditional values, religious and moral, attached to the work 
ethic. But it also has a strong contractarian association in the context of social 
security and with the reciprocal obligations of citizenship. The latter are re-
flected in the long-standing principle of universal insurance but have been given 
additional emphasis by government in recent years as political justifications for 
making welfare entitlement increasingly conditional, particularly at a time when 
levels of unemployment had begun to fall and the availability of work increased.  
In 1994 the Government set out its proposals for JSA, stating three main 
aims to the new benefit (Department for Employment/DSS 1994). First, JSA 
would “improve the operation of the labour market by helping people in their 
search for work, while ensuring that they understand and fulfil the conditions for 
receipt of benefit”. Secondly, it would result in a better deal for taxpayers, since 
it would offer “streamlined administration, closer targeting on those who need 
financial support and a regime which more effectively helps people back into 
work”. Thirdly, it would provide a better service to claimants by virtue of there 
being a “clearer, more consistent benefit structure, and by better service deliv-
ery”. What was contemplated was a more active, managed process of ensuring 
that the unemployed retained a firm attachment to the labour market. This meant 
a shift in the balance between state and individual responsibility. Claimants 
would only enjoy a maximum period on contribution based benefit of just six 
months rather than 12, a change which reflected a further diminution of the in-
surance principle (Buck 1996). There would also be increased pressure to engage 
in the search for work or to participate in activities which enhance the prospects 
of securing full-time employment. The new measures included a requirement to 
enter into a “jobseeker’s agreement” with the relevant government agency, cur-
rently called “Jobcentre Plus”. There would be an even wider range of sanctions 
for non-cooperation or non-compliance.  
JSA is a complex benefit, made the more so by a legal structure based largely 
on secondary legislation that is subject to frequent amendment. Although the 
Labour Government post 1997 has developed a new programme of activities de-
signed to provide a welfare-to-work pathway, notably the various New Deal 
programmes offering work experience and/or a programme of training or educa-
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tion (such as the New Deal for Young People, New Deal 25 Plus and New Deal 
for Lone Parents), it has not significantly altered the basic architecture of the 
JSA scheme. It should be borne in mind that because of the attempt to individu-
alise and personalise the relationship between the claimant and the advisory 
team in the jobcentre, it is important to judge the system with particular refer-
ence to the way that the process is managed on the ground. For example, in 2005 
the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) introduced a series of pilots in-
volving quite different regimes affecting those claiming JSA who had entered 
the so-called “gateway” when they have to attend the jobcentre every fortnight 
for a “jobsearch review”. This process of attendance is still known by its tradi-
tional name of “signing on”. Under the pilots, some claimants were able to sign 
on by telephone. Others were excused signing on for the first 7 or 13 weeks but 
were telephoned at random to discuss their worksearch activities. Some fort-
nightly reviews were conducted in groups. Piloting of this kind is complemented 
by a constant process of review and evaluation, designed to maximise efficien-
cies while retaining adequate controls. The evaluation of this particular pilot 
turned out to be mostly inconclusive but recommended against a national roll-
out of the 13 week and telephone signing on arrangements, since they were less 
effective at getting people into work. Moreover, it was found that the extra bene-
fit payments that were required were “likely to be greater than the administrative 
savings” (Middlemas 2006, para 10.7).  
The structure of JSA 
One of the fundamental aims of the JA 1995 was to establish a single benefit for 
the unemployed. However, it is basically two different benefits albeit within a 
common framework and a joint name. As noted above, there are two types of 
JSA: 
1. Contribution-based JSA. This is payable for a maximum of 182 days 
(six months). Entitlement is dependent upon (among other things) having 
paid or been credited with sufficient national insurance contributions 
(per section 2 of the Act). 
2. Income-based JSA. This is payable to persons who do not meet the 
contribution conditions for CBJSA or who have exhausted their entitle-
ment to it, provided, in either case, that they satisfy a mean test. 
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The detail of the JSA scheme, including the rate at which weekly JSA is to be 
paid,1 is set out in secondary legislation, in the Jobseeker’s Allowance Regulations 
1996 (SI 1996/207), as amended (the JSA Regs). 
General conditions of entitlement 
The general conditions of entitlement for both types of JSA are (JS Act, section 
1(2)-(2D)), all of which must be satisfied, reflect the purpose of this benefit as a 
means of support for those who are not in work but who nevertheless would be ex-
pected to have an attachment to the labour market by virtue of their age, physical or 
mental capacity for work and the fact that they are not engaged in full-time educa-
tion. The conditions require the claimant to demonstrate that attachment to the la-
bour market through, for example, an active engagement in the search for work. 
The conditions, all of which must be satisfied, are that the claimant is: in Great 
Britain; under pensionable age; “available for employment”; “actively seeking em-
ployment”; signed up to an extant jobseeker’s agreement; capable of work; not en-
gaged, nor his or her partner engaged, in “remunerative work” (defined as 16 hours 
per week on average, or 24 hours per week in the case of the claimant’s partner); 
not receiving relevant education (basically non-advanced full-time education); and 
meets the relevant contribution conditions for CBJSA or the income based condi-
tions for IBJSA. 
The JSA scheme retains the minimum age of entitlement of 18. However, the 
regulations (regs 57-61) prescribe exceptional cases when a young person (aged 16 
or 17) may nonetheless be eligible for JSA. In addition, a 16 or 17 year old who is 
not entitled to JSA and is registered for training but not being provided with any 
may be awarded a “severe hardship payment”, under section 16 of the 1995 Act. 
However, even that may be revoked if the young person rejects a reasonable train-
ing opportunity or job vacancy or interview or opportunity to apply. Severe hard-
ship JSA can also be reduced by 40% of the personal allowance element of the 
benefit in some circumstances, such as where the young person has given up a 
place on a training scheme or has failed to attend the scheme or has lost their place 
on it through misconduct (JS Act, section 17; JSA Regs 1996, reg.63).  
                                           
1 The current rates of weekly benefit (until April 2009) of CBJSA are  
Aged under 18 £47.95 
Aged 18-24 £47.95 
Aged 25 or over £60.50  
– minus deductions:  
£1 per £1 for amounts of occupational or personal pension in excess of £50 per week; £1 per £1 for the claimant’s 
earnings (subject to prescribed disregards). 
The calculation of IBJSA entitlement, on the other hand, is very complex due to it being a means tested-benefit 
with separate and very detailed income and capital limits and calculation rules. The basic rates of personal allow-
ance are the same as for CBJSA, but claimants may be entitled to various premiums in respect of disability or 
other factors, which will increase entitlement (JSA Regs, regs 82-86D). There are separate rates for couples. 
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The availability and job search conditions 
Available for employment 
The basic test of availability per se, which has remained the same for over 30 years, 
is that the claimant must be “willing and able to take up immediately any employed 
earner’s employment” (JS Act 1995, section 6(1)). This requirement of immediacy 
is strict, although there are limited exceptions: for example, it is sufficient for a per-
son who has caring responsibilities to be willing and able to take up employment 
within 48 hours; and in the case of a person engaged in volunteer work the take-up 
time is extended to one week, provided he or she is prepared to attend for interview 
for employment within 48 hours (JSA regs 1996, reg.5). The employment that the 
claimant must be willing and able to take up must be of at least 40 hours per week. 
The claimant can limit the amount that is acceptable to a set amount of 40 or more 
hours provided his or her “pattern of availability” affords him or her reasonable 
prospects of securing such employment (JSA Regs, regs 6 and 7). The claimant 
must also be available for work on all days during the benefit week; unavailability 
on one day (even if he or she nevertheless remains available for more than 40 hours 
in total in that week) means loss of a week’s benefit. Normally there is no provision 
to award JSA for part only of week (Commissioner’s Decision R(JSA)3/01, para 4).  
The claimant has in fact long been permitted to set some restrictions on the 
kinds and place of work he or she is willing to accept, while remaining “available 
for work”. There is what has become known as a “reasonable restrictions test”, 
which is tightly regulated and less flexible than in the past (see JS Act 1995, section 
6(2) and (3), JSA Regs, regs. 7, 8, 9 and 13). In addition to the limited right to re-
strict availability to 40 hours or more per week, mentioned above, a claimant may 
limit his availability with reference to the nature or terms of conditions of employ-
ment (including the rate of pay) or the locality of the work, provided he can show 
he or she has “reasonable prospects of securing employment notwithstanding those 
restrictions” and other prescribed restrictions on his availability. However, any al-
lowed restrictions related to pay will cease to have effect once the claimant has 
been in receipt of JSA for six months. The claimant may also restrict the nature of 
the employment he or she is willing to undertake with reference to a sincerely held 
religious belief/conscientious objection “provided he can show reasonable pros-
pects of securing employment notwithstanding those restrictions”. A claimant may 
also set restrictions which are “reasonable in the light of his physical or mental 
condition”. In some circumstances a claimant who is a carer is permitted to restrict 
his or her total hours of work availability to an amount below 40 in any week, again 
subject to the same “reasonable prospects of employment” condition. The law sets 
out the factors to be taken into account in assessing whether a person has “reason-
able prospects of securing employment”, which it will have been seen is a condition 
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linked to several of the permitted restrictions.2 The onus lies with the claimant to 
show, for this purpose, that he or she has reasonable prospects (JSA Regs, reg.10). 
For a short period at the start of the claim the claimant may in any event be 
permitted to restrict his or her availability to his or her usual employment, work 
that pays no less than the amount he or she is accustomed to receive from work, or 
both. Those restrictions may only be set for a limited period of not less than one 
week nor more than 13 weeks; the actual permitted length will be determined with 
reference to a range of factors essentially designed to reflect any specialism and the 
degree of experience – such as the nature of his or her usual occupation, the claim-
ant’s skills, the length of training for the occupation, the length of time he or she 
worked in such employment and the time that has elapsed since he or she worked in 
it (JS Act 1995, section 6(5) and JSA regs 1996, reg.16). Thus a qualified account-
ant who becomes unemployed after 20 years may be granted a longer period in 
which to restrict his or her availability to that job than an unskilled former shop as-
sistant with no training would be permitted to confine his or her availability to shop 
work.  
Actively seeking employment 
A person will be classed as actively seeking employment in any week “if he takes 
in that week such steps as he can reasonably be expected to have to take in order to 
have the best prospects of securing employment” (JS Act 1995, s 7(1), JSA Regs, 
reg.18). But the claimant will have to take more than two such steps in any week 
unless taking fewer two steps is reasonable for that person to do that week. The ex-
pected steps might include oral or written job applications; seeking information on 
the availability of employment from job ads, employment agencies and employers; 
getting specialist advice; drawing up a curriculum vitae; and seeking a reference or 
testimonial from previous employer. Various factors must be taken into account in 
determining what would be reasonable steps for the particular claimant to be ex-
pected to take. Some relate to claimant him or herself, such as his or her skills, 
qualifications and abilities and physical or mental qualifications; some relate to his 
or her actions in trying to secure work, such as the steps taken in the previous week 
and their effectiveness; and others relate to the availability or location of any va-
cancies. 
The law is so concerned to prevent possible abuse of the system that it stipulates 
that steps taken are to be ignored where the claimant, while taking them, “acted in a 
violent or abusive manner”; or he or she spoiled a job application; or “by his behav-
iour or appearance… otherwise undermined his prospects of securing the employ-
ment in question” (see Wikeley 1996). The claimant will, however, be excused this 
conduct if “the circumstances were due to reasons beyond [his or her] control”.  
 
                                           
2 JSA regs, Reg.10(2). They include the claimant’s skills, qualifications and experience; the type and number of 
vacancies within daily travelling distance from his or her home; the length of time he or she has been unem-
ployed; the job applications which he or she has made and their outcome; and his or her willingness to move 
home to obtain employment. 
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Attendance, information and evidence 
The above provisions are reinforced by administrative controls exerted via a power 
to require the claimant to attend at a place and at such time as an officer may spec-
ify, and to provide information and evidence “as to his circumstances, his availabil-
ity for employment and the extent to which he is actively seeking employment” (JS 
Act 1995, section 8). The officer/adviser may notify time and place of attendance, 
and may require a claimant to provide a signed declaration as to his or her avail-
ability and active search for work (JSA Regs, regs 23, 23A and 24). The attendance 
requirement is capable of strict enforcement (see regs 25 and 26), as entitlement to 
benefit will normally cease if the claimant fails to attend on the day specified in the 
notification, or at the stipulated time, or if the claimant fails to provide a signed 
declaration that he or she has been available for or actively seeking employment.  
These are strict conditions, clearly designed to ensure that claimants conform to 
the expected pattern of behaviour in return for benefit. The agency seems to apply 
the attendance condition particularly firmly: in 2005-06, for example, there were 
154,800 referrals to a “Sanctions Decision Maker” in such cases and in 74% of 
them (115,050) a benefit sanction (a reduction of the personal allowance element of 
the benefit, by 20%) was applied (HCPAC 2007). The sanction is not to be applied, 
however, where the claimant shows that there was “good cause” for the failure 
(regs.27-30), provided he or she shows it within 5 days of the failure to comply. A 
range of factors may be considered in determining whether there was good cause. 
Inadequate notification by Jobcentre Plus is specifically identified as one of them.  
The jobseeker’s agreement 
As noted above, one of the primary conditions of entitlement to JSA is entry into a 
jobseeker’s agreement. This is “[a]n agreement which is entered into by a claimant 
and an employment officer and which complies with the prescribed requirements in 
force at the time when the agreement is made…” (JS Act 1995, section 9(1)). It 
must be in writing and signed by both parties, and it can be varied by agreement 
(sections 9(3) and 10). The contractual element reflected in the notion of “agree-
ment” implies mutuality and voluntariness, but the jobseeker’s agreement is very 
one-sided. As Lundy (2000, 304) argues, “The official’s hand which shakes on this 
agreement is truly a hand of velvet masking a fist of steel, since failure to sign up to 
the agreement will result in the claimant being denied benefit”. Entry into an 
agreement can, in this regard, be seen as part of the process of “responsibilization”, 
involving state governance of behaviour intended to make people behave as “re-
sponsible” citizens (Ican and Basok 2004, 130-133). In that sense, it epitomises the 
attempt under both the Conservative and now the Labour Government to rebalance 
rights and responsibilities by placing a greater emphasis on the latter (Lister 2003; 
Lund 2008).  
The required contents of the agreement are specified by regulations. They in-
clude the claimant’s name; the stated hours of availability; any agreed restrictions 
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on availability; the type of employment sought by claimant; the action the claimant 
will take to seek employment and to improve his/her prospects of finding employ-
ment; the start and finish dates of any permitted period during which the claimant 
does not have to be available for up to 40 hours per week; and a statement of the 
claimant’s rights to challenge a determination or direction by the Secretary of 
State.3 
Sanctions 
As we have seen, sanctions have long been a feature of this area of social security 
law They were originally designed to prevent abuse of the system and to protect the 
insurance fund from unjustified claims. While these remain part of the continuing 
justification for them, their intensification under JSA, and therefore the tighter con-
trol of behaviour that they impose, signifies a greater intolerance of any shortfall in 
the claimant’s commitment to the labour market and a concern to further the state’s 
interest in minimising public reliance on the benefits system and to re-emphasise 
the responsibility of citizens to support themselves through work. As a review of 
social security sanctions by the Social Security Advisory Committee says, one of 
the main objectives of JSA sanctions is to “induce individuals to act in accordance 
with their job-search responsibilities as part of the ‘rights and responsibilities’ 
agenda” (SSAC 2006: 54).  
One of the major features of the sanctions regime, as shown in Michael Adler’s 
paper in this collection, is that there is a significant element of officer (or office) 
discretion in many cases. The SSAC has highlighted the inconsistencies in the ad-
ministration of sanctions, in terms of the “significant differences” between district 
offices in the numbers of sanctions imposed (or in referral of cases for possible 
sanctioning). As the SSAC states, the discrepancies result in “inequity, as where a 
claimant lives may determine whether they are sanctioned” (SSAC 2006: 69) 
In addition to the sanctions of discretionary (variable) length, which represent a 
continuity with the old unemployment benefit rules, there are now sanctions related 
to the worksearch conditions that are primarily of fixed length. Tables 1 and 2 in 
the Appendix contain statistics on the number of referrals for a sanctions decision 
and the number of fixed period and discretionary length sanctions imposed between 
2000 and 2006. It will be seen that while only one quarter of referrals in discretion-
ary length sanction cases result in the imposition of a sanction, the rate of sanction-
ing is twice as high in fixed term cases. The statistics also reveal a decline in the 
numbers of referrals and sanctions. However, discretionary length sanctions fell 
much more sharply than fixed term sanctions (and, in fact, at a much steeper rate 
                                           
3 Under JS Act 1995, s 9(6), the officer must, if asked to do so by the claimant, refer the proposed JS agreement to 
the Secretary of State for him to determine whether, (i) if the claimant complies with the agreement and its terms 
he would satisfy the statutory requirement to be available for or actively seeking employment, or (ii) it is reason-
able to expect the claimant to have to comply with the agreement. On such a reference, the Secretary of State is to 
give such directions regarding the terms of the agreement as he considers appropriate: section 9(7). 
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than the fall in jobseeker numbers). From representing nearly 75% of all sanction 
cases in 2002, the proportion of cases that were discretionary length cases fell to 
around 67% in 2006.  
In the case of either type of sanction the period of sanction eats into the 182 day 
period of entitlement. This is because JSA entitlement continues during the sanction 
period, even if payment does not. In addition, as noted earlier, claimants can have 
their claim for benefit disallowed for failure to attend a regular interview with the 
personal adviser at Jobcentre Plus.  
The sanctions are identified in the JS Act 1995, sections 19-20B. It will be seen 
that in some cases a sanction may not be imposed because the claimant had a “good 
cause” for acting as he or she did. It is a matter of judgment for the relevant official 
as to whether a person had “good cause”, but the JSA Regulations prescribe factors 
that should be taken into account for the purposes of determining this question.4  
Sanction of discretionary (or variable) length 
A sanction of discretionary length may be applied where the claimant has lost his 
or her employment due to misconduct; or voluntarily left it “without just cause”; or 
where without “good cause” he or she failed to apply for or accept a vacancy noti-
fied by the jobcentre or in any event “neglected to avail himself of a reasonable op-
portunity of employment”. The period of sanction must be set at between one week 
and 26 weeks. The precise length of the period in an individual case is to be deter-
mined by the Secretary of State – in practice, an official acting on his/her behalf. 
There is some limited guidance in the regulations as to particular matters that 
should be taken into account in determining the length of the sanction. For exam-
ple, account should be taken of “any mitigating circumstances of physical or mental 
stress” connected with the employment which the claimant has left or neglects to 
pursue (JSA Regs, reg.70) Otherwise there is a need to refer to the substantial body 
of case law that has developed over the years in which these various sanction 
grounds have been in operation, particularly those relating to misconduct and vol-
untarily leaving without just cause. The case law confirms, for example, that a per-
son who came close to establishing justification for leaving voluntarily may expect 
a short period of sanction (see Wikeley 2002, ch 9).  
                                           
4 For example, a claimant would have good cause for non-participation in a training programme if he or she has a 
condition or personal circumstance such that participation would be detrimental to his/her health; or where non-
participation resulted from religious or conscientious objection; or if caring responsibilities make it unreasonable 
to participate: JSA Regs, reg.73. Other factors may also be taken into account in determining whether or not there 
was good cause. In the case of a claimant’s failing or refusing to take up a particular job or to comply with a job-
seeker’s direction, the above mentioned factors are among those which should be taken into account by the offi-
cer, but they do not automatically give rise to good cause: see reg.72. Other factors to be taken into account in-
clude excessive travelling time and the disproportionality of expenses incurred by the claimant in undertaking the 
job or complying with the jobseeker’s direction.  
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Sanctions of prescribed length 
The sanctions of prescribed length apply where there is a failure/refusal, without 
good cause to carry out any jobseeker’s direction which was reasonable in his cir-
cumstances or to participate in (or attend or remain on) a training scheme or em-
ployment programme (such as under one of the New Deal programmes) notified to 
him or her; or has lost his or her place on such a scheme through misconduct (note 
there is no “good cause” excuse here). The statute empowers the length of the pre-
scribed length of the sanction to be somewhere between one to 26 weeks. The sanc-
tion for refusal or failure to carry out a jobseeker’s direction is a fixed period of two 
weeks. If there is a further breach within 12 months of the first, the sanction is four 
weeks. If the sanction is applied for a failure to take up or apply for a training 
scheme or employment programme or for the circumstances in ground (c), the 
sanction is a fixed period of two weeks. Again, if there is a further breach within 12 
months of the first, the sanction is four weeks (reg.69). However, it is 26 weeks if 
the failure etc relates to an act or omission in respect of one of the specified New 
Deal options or in relation to the Intense Activity Period (for 25-49 year olds, last-
ing 52 weeks) and in either case there have been two or more sanctions for such a 
failure in relation to these options by the claimant, the most recent being within the 
previous 12 months.  
Hardship 
A claimant may be entitled to some JSA notwithstanding disqualification under the 
above provisions, but it can be made payable at a reduced rate or for a prescribed 
period. In essence, the claimant will have to show that he or a member of his 
household will suffer hardship during the period of the sanction. The regulations 
prescribe when a person is in hardship (for example, a woman is pregnant, or per-
son has a long term medical condition restricting functional capacity, or a person is 
caring for another who is receiving disability benefits) and the date from which a 
payment is to be made (JSA Regs, regs 140-141). If the claimant is entitled under 
these hardship rules, his or her benefit is reduced by 40% of the personal allowance 
for a single person or by 20% if the claimant or any member of his her family is ei-
ther pregnant or seriously ill (regs145 and 146A-H).  
The impact and effectiveness of sanctions 
Although there is constant evaluation of welfare-to-work policies such as Pathways 
to Work and the role of the advisers working in Jobcentre Plus who deal with job-
seekers, there has until recently been no attempt to review the operation of the 
benefit sanctions and the traditional structures which still underpin the statutory re-
gime governing benefits for the unemployed. However, in the 2004 the Govern-
ment promised a review of the JSA sanctions for non-compliance “to ensure that 
the penalties for failure to carry out responsibilities are timely, fair, practical and 
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effective” (Chancellor of the Exchequer 2004, para 4.31). In 2006 the Department 
for Work and Pensions published two reports based on research into the benefit 
sanctions. One of the reports, by Joyce and Whiting (2006), is based on research 
into the effects of sanctioning regime operated by Jobcentre Plus on lone parents, in 
connection with failure to attend work-focused interviews (WFIs). These are regu-
lar claimant interviews with an adviser, intended to explore routes into work and 
review progress; a lone parent on income support would be required to attend such 
an interview when the youngest or only child reaches the age of five years and 
three months. At the time of Joyce and Whiting’s report the interviews were an-
nual, but from 30 April 2007 they have become six-monthly and will be extended 
to lone parents with children under five from 28 April 2008.5 The report relates to 
means-tested income support entitlement. A lone parent can qualify for this benefit 
(to which jobsearch and availability conditions per se are not attached) while they 
still have a child under the age of 14, although this age is set to fall (see below). 
The other report (by Peters and Joyce 2006) reviews JSA sanctions, based on a 
sample of over 3,000 interviewees.  
Joyce and Whiting found that claimants generally understood the principle be-
hind the sanctioning regime but not the specific details of the amount by which 
their income support would be reduced or the length of the period for which their 
reduction in benefit would run. Claimants tended to have negative feelings about 
the invitation to attend a WFI. Some felt they were being coerced and would be 
forced into taking a job when they attended rather than having the opportunity to 
discuss career options. Some had difficulties attending because they had health 
problems or there were childcare difficulties. There were, however, some who wel-
comed the opportunity to discuss their options. There was evidence that sanctions 
had caused hardship, since many claimants had already been struggling on the rate 
of benefit they received. The reported that their children often lost out, as pocket 
money or treats were denied. Some had become indebted to friends or family, who 
would need to be repaid out of future benefit. Stress and anxiety had been exacer-
bated.  
The researchers considered possible changes that could be made to the sanction-
ing policy and process in the light of suggestions from claimants and Jobcentre Plus 
advisers. There was a view that sanctions should be considered a last resort and that 
claimants should be given a “second chance” before they were applied. Another op-
tion could be to reduce the rate of the sanction from 20% to less or to abolish sanc-
tions altogether and instead provide an incentive of additional benefit for atten-
dance.  
                                           
5 The Social Security (Work-focused Interviews for Lone Parents) Amendment Regulations 2007 (SI No 
1034/2007). Note that those living in an area in which one of the New Deal welfare-to-work programmes oper-
ates, namely the New Deal Plus for Lone Parents, who have been continuously entitled to income support for at 
least 12 months and whose youngest child is aged 11-13 could be required to undergo a work-focused interview 
every 13 weeks.  
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The JSA research by Peters and Joyce was based on a much bigger sample than 
the lone parents research and incorporated significant quantitative as well as quali-
tative elements. The research found that there were no significant differences be-
tween sanctioned and non-sanctioned claimants in terms of gender, ethnicity or ill-
ness/disability, or on the basis of their qualifications, literacy or numeracy. But 
sanctioned claimants tended to be younger. This was attributable to young claim-
ants’ more relaxed attitude towards sanctions, which was possibly due to the fact 
that they tended to live with parents who could provide some financial support. 
Claimants to whom sanctions were applied were also more likely to have a learning 
difficulty, particularly those who were sanctioned over participation in the New 
Deal programme. 
Most claimants reported some understanding of the rules on claiming JSA. 
Among the others, those with literacy problems or who were of non-white ethnicity 
or new claimants had the least understanding. Generally the acquisition of knowl-
edge appeared to be linked to the level of experience of the jobcentre. Those who 
were sanctioned for “voluntarily leaving” their employment tended to have low 
levels of knowledge. Typically, there was an erroneous view that sanctions only 
applied to persons who worked while claiming benefit. As with the lone parents re-
search, claimants lacked a detailed knowledge of how sanctions operated. Only 2% 
of those questioned identified “voluntary leaving without just cause” as a sanction 
ground.  
The research found that challenging a sanction would not generally be contem-
plated. Those subjected to a sanction would probably not ask for a reconsideration 
or bring an appeal, a tendency that is perhaps reflected in the very low number of 
appeals on sanctions coming before tribunals. Reasons for not appealing varied, al-
though some respondents simply lacked awareness of the right to appeal or thought 
the appeal process would be overly complicated, drawn out or likely to end in fail-
ure. In some cases claimants had been discouraged from appealing by their adviser 
or had found a job. 
It is interesting that the supposed deterrent effect of sanctions, for example in 
relation to voluntarily leaving one’s employment, is not borne out by the views ex-
pressed by claimants, a majority of whom either did not know they would be sanc-
tioned or did not feel that it could have been avoided. However, once they had ex-
perienced a sanction, many claimants seemed to be concerned to avoid one in the 
future. DWP statistics cited in the report show that of those sanctioned, 73% had 
only been sanctioned once, although the paucity of second or subsequent sanctions 
might partly be attributable to the take-up of employment. It is also interesting that 
a substantial majority of claimants, even those who had experienced a sanction, 
agreed with the principle of sanctioning for those who did not comply with the 
conditions attached to claiming JSA, although they were much less likely to think 
that it was fair to sanction them. Some Jobcentre Plus advisers said that sanctions 
“could have a destructive effect on the relationship and rapport between advisers 
and their customers which might inhibit their ability to work effectively with cus-
tomers in the future”. Needless to say, this research also found that sanctions had a 
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significant impact on claimants’ finances and strained family relationships and 
friendships. 
The research also asked claimants whether they would prefer a regime of “fixed 
fines” rather than sanctions. The Government appears keen to explore their viabil-
ity. Overall, the responses seem to have indicated a slightly greater concern about 
fixed fines than sanctions; the former were perhaps more likely than sanctions to 
influence behaviour. The SSAC has suggested that if fines replaced the current 
sanctions regime it would have the advantage of a reduced financial impact on 
claimants (SSAC 2006: 69).  
Overall, the JSA research concluded that the sanctions regime was “broadly ef-
fective” and did influence behaviour to some extent, but was not as well understood 
as it could be. The researchers conclude that, among other things, the major policy 
challenge is to raise awareness levels and detailed understanding of the processes 
among claimants, perhaps through simplification of the system. The SSAC has 
similarly recommended improved communication “at all stages of the sanctions 
process” (SSAC 2006: 68). It has also suggested that because the sanction for vol-
untarily leaving employment is not well understood by claimants, and therefore has 
a reduced disincentive effect, one possible reform that should be considered is 
easement so that a sanction would only be imposed on the second or subsequent 
occasion that a person left a job voluntarily (SSAC 2006: 69); information could be 
given on the first occasion that would serve as notice and a warning.  
Forthcoming reforms: an “active” benefits system 
Jobseekers will face a more intensive regime of activation under forthcoming re-
forms. The DWP talks of “raising expectations of what a jobseeker should contrib-
ute” (DWP 2007a: 49). There will be more clearly defined stages in the administra-
tion of the regime facing a jobseeker. They will start with a widening of jobsearch 
expectations after three months on benefit. After six months there would be entry to 
a “Gateway” stage, with a formal review of the jobseeker’s agreement, the drawing 
up of a back-to-work plan involving mandatory “agreed” activities – with sanctions 
for failure to comply – and a skills “health check” with the offer of any necessary 
training. After 12 months, the claimant would be referred to a specialist return-to-
work provider. The provider would be paid by results to find work for the claimant. 
What is particularly interesting and also controversial about that stage is the poten-
tial involvement in the JSA regime of voluntary and private sector providers (as 
recommended by Freud 2007), and thus harnessing of the profit motive. The Secre-
tary of State for Work and Pensions has recently argued that “[w]e should not be 
ideological about who provides the service, we should just work out who is best at 
providing it” (quoted in Webster 2008). The DWP has published a “Commissioning 
Strategy” in respect of this provision (DWP 2008a), which is indicative of its po-
tential spread within the benefits system. Those still not in work after these stages 
have been completed would be required to undertake work experience (DWP 
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2007a), which the Government has recently indicated would be for a minimum of 
four weeks.  
As Dorsal (2008) has recently pointed out, there has been and remains a crucial 
dualist feature of the UK’s social security system: those required to maintain an at-
tachment to the labour market and (since 1989) be actively engaged in the search 
for employment are distinguished from those of working age but not expected to 
seek work because they are caring for young children (as lone parents) or whose 
mental or physical condition makes them incapable of work (see also Rahilly’s 
chapter in this collection). In some cases claimants can cross the boundary between 
the two categories (Kemp and Davidson 2007). With the numbers in receipt of in-
capacity benefit reaching over 2.5 million (as compared with approximately 
800,000 receiving JSA as at February 2008) and the arguments that with the exten-
sion of in-work benefits and other support (including after-school childcare) the ex-
emption of all non-working lone parents with children under 16 from work-search 
requirements seen by government as increasingly less justifiable, there is growing 
pressure to shift the boundary so that more claimants are subjected to a JSA-type 
regime.  
In the case of people on incapacity benefit (or incapacity credits for people re-
ceiving income support), despite the trumpeted success of the Pathways to Work 
programme for encouraging and supporting people back into work the Government 
has embarked on a restructuring of benefits in order to place a particular emphasis 
on the possibility of working rather than on incapacity for work. The idea is to re-
duce by at least one million the numbers who receive benefit on the basis of inca-
pacity for work (Rahilly 2006). The new benefit, entitled Employment and Support 
Allowance – which, according to the familiar rhetoric, is being “built on the princi-
ple of rights and responsibilities” and will involve the claimant’s participation in 
WFIs and signing up to an action plan, with sanctions for default (DWP 2006) – 
will be introduced in October 2008, under the Welfare Reform Act 2007. The re-
gime will be tougher than many incapacity benefit claimants currently face, particu-
larly because many claimants will be required to undertake a “work-related activ-
ity”. It is estimated that as a consequence there will be approximately 20,000 addi-
tional appeals per annum made to the appeal tribunal, 14,000 of which will result in 
a hearing (DWP 2008b). There are also fears that if Jobcentre Plus offices are set 
job-entry targets the degree of tension between the enabling and enforcing roles of 
personal advisers, which has been falling (Knight et al 2005), may increase.  
Meanwhile, changes to the position of lone parents are being introduced and the 
regime for those claiming JSA is being further intensified. Despite an improving 
employment rate for this group, which has risen from 44.7% in 1997s to 57.2% in 
2007 (Chancellor of the Exchequer 2007), the DWP has set an objective of increas-
ing this rate to 70% by 2010, which would mean that a further 300,000 lone parents 
enter employment (HCWPC 2007: para 226). The Government has endorsed a rec-
ommendation of the independent review it commissioned on the welfare-to-work 
strategy, by David Freud, that lone parents of children younger than 16 should be 
expected to seek work if they are to continue to receive out of work benefits. Freud 
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recommended that lone parents should only enjoy their current exemption until the 
child is 12 years old and that they should be required to participate in regular WFIs 
(Freud 2007). Part of the rationale is that their benefit position was out of line with 
that in states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands, where a work test may 
be applied once the lone parent’s child reaches the age of three (or five in the case 
of the Netherlands). It was also considered to be inconsistent with the intended po-
sition that many other claimants in the UK would face once the Employment and 
Support Allowance (above) is introduced. The Government has endorsed Freud’s 
recommendation and proposes to implement progressively, starting in October 
2008. From October 2009 it will be extended to lone parents whose child is aged 
10. From 2010 the exemption will not apply where the child is aged 7 and over 
(DWP 2007a and 2007b).  
The independent statutory advisory body, the Social Security Advisory Com-
mittee (SSAC), has concerns about the fact that lone parents “will simply be trans-
ferred onto the current JSA regime with its relatively intensive work-focused condi-
tionality” (SSAC 2007: para 3.3). There is in fact evidence that increasing the con-
ditionality of benefits may be less successful in maximising jobsearch, take-up and 
retention of employment among lone parents than intensifying the involvement of 
personal advisers and providing a more active encouragement to participate in 
work-related programmes such as the New Deal for Lone Parents (HCWPC 2007; 
DWP 2006). Indeed, support for lone parents making the transition to work has 
been introduced, such as a £250 job grant for those entering work after 26 weeks or 
more on income support and a discretion for personal advisers to extend the pay-
ment of benefit for up to four weeks after a lone parent starts work and is waiting 
for their first salary payment. Lone parents are also going to be offered a financial 
incentive to undertake an activity which helps to prepare them for entry into the la-
bour market, in the form of a “Work Related Activity Premium” (DWP 2007a: 44).  
Improvements to the system of means-tested tax credits, a form of support paid 
to people on low incomes in work, have also been recommended as particularly 
useful in the realization of these goals for lone parents. There is considered to be a 
need to increase their flexibility and to reduce the likelihood and impact of the 
overpayment of credits, which is a feature of the system’s method of (in effect) re-
calculating entitlement at the end of the fiscal and benefits year (Millar 2008). The 
House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee has found in its recent inquiry 
that more flexibility in the JSA regime is needed to facilitate a pattern of work that 
is consistent with the burden of family responsibilities that lone parents have to dis-
charge; there were “real concerns that JSA conditionality cannot be adapted to re-
flect the complex realities of lone parents’ lives” (HCWPC 2008: paras 227-235). 
However, the Government has argued that there is already flexibility in terms of the 
work pattern lone parents may be expected to follow in the light of their particular 
circumstances, but it plans to increase the discretion available to advisers (DWP 
2007b: 41-42). Another constant barrier to employment among lone parents is the 
unaffordability or unavailability of suitable childcare. There is a childcare tax credit 
to meet some or all of the cost, but the DWP has had to acknowledge that that does 
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not guarantee that affordable childcare will be available to all claimants. The House 
of Commons Work and Pensions Committee has recently argued that 
“[c]onditionality should be linked to the availability of childcare and before and af-
ter school care” (HCWPC 2008: para 252). The Government, while committing it-
self to improve childcare provision, has undertaken to avoid penalizing a claimant 
who either fails to take up or leaves a job because of the unavailability of appropri-
ate and affordable childcare (DWP 2007b: 35); the Work and Pension Committee 
says that the burden of proof to show that childcare is available to a claimant 
should rest with the DWP, not the claimant (HCWPC 2008: para 252).  
Conclusion 
The aim of this review of the development of the legal structure surrounding the 
principal benefit concerned with unemployment has been to show the continuities 
and changes and how they have shaped both the form and operation of this benefit. 
The intensification of the activation policy that the post-1995 system in particular 
represents and which has included, since the start of Labour’s administration in 
1997, a range of welfare-to-work policies and programmes – principally the various 
New Deal schemes targeted at different groups and offering, variously, a period of 
work experience, training or education – is not merely a response to particular eco-
nomic or social pressures. While it might be assumed, for example, that a greater 
concentration on measures to increase employability by ensuring participation in 
training or employment experience means that it has become more difficult for citi-
zens of working age to find work, that is only partially true, in that while particular 
skills may be in greater demand now, there is nonetheless a fairly high overall de-
mand for labour, certainly compared with earlier years. But at the same time, the 
greater opportunities for employment have given political justification to the impo-
sition of a greater squeeze on the unemployed through the benefits system, a system 
that the Government is trying to turn into an “active” one under which those not in 
employment are moved away from being “passive recipients of benefit” (or, as 
stated in the same document, “recipients of passive benefits”!) to become “partici-
pants” or “jobseekers” who are “actively seeking and preparing for work” (DWP 
2007b: 10 and 103). However, as Dostal (2008: 34, 35) points out, while trying to 
convey the impression that it is significantly tightening up the benefit regime, the 
Government’s “actual policy change has been limited in scope and has mostly fo-
cused on the renaming of existing policy instruments such as the interview regime 
between Jobcentre staff and their clients”, while “the policing of the system in 
terms of benefit sanctions has remained similar to that operating in the pre-Labour 
and pre-New Deal period”.  
The continuities in the law illustrate Clasen’s point that the developments in so-
cial security policies are not merely a response to social, economic and political 
pressures, but also national traditions and institutional structures (Clasen 1994). 
There is a long tradition of penalising those deemed to be workshy through reduc-
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tions in benefit or disqualification from entitlement. The recent reviews of the op-
eration of the sanctions regime suggest that traditions may sometimes need dis-
placement not merely in pursuit of ideological goals but for reasons of practicality 
and, more importantly, fairness (see White and Cooke 2007). Moreover, on the ba-
sis that there is an economic case for benefit conditionality as reflected in the JSA 
regime, there must also be concern that, as a witness to the HCWPC’s recent in-
quiry commented, JSA has “possibly the most out-of-date set of entitlement rules in 
the whole benefits system, much of it unchanged since 1911 and not designed for 
the modern economy” (HCWPC 2008: Minutes of Evidence, Q153). 
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Appendix 
STATISTICS ON J.S.A. BENEFIT SANCTIONS, GREAT BRITAIN, 2000-2006 
 
(Source: House of Commons Written Answers, 12 March 2007, cols 165W-166W) 
Note: figures are rounded to the nearest 10. 
 
Table 1: Fixed Length Sanctions 
Quarter ending, in which decision 
was made 
Number of referrals Number of referrals which 
resulted in a sanction 
April-May 2000 11,120 5,650 
August 2000 16,610 8,380 
November 2000 17,930 8,470 
February 2001 17,140 8,330 
May 2001 17,890 8,620 
August 2001 17,790 8,380 
November 2001 17,160 7,790 
February 2002 15,250 7,040 
May 2002 18,480 8,530 
August 2002 18,480 8,630 
November 2002 17,550 8,250 
February 2003 15,540 7,660 
May 2003 16,590 8,250 
August 2003 16,890 8,530 
November 2003 15,900 7,760 
February 2004 14,340 7,010 
May 2004 14,470 7,170 
August 2004 15,390 7,580 
November 2004 15,430 7,530 
February 2005 13,840 7,020 
May 2005 15,120 7,680 
August 2005 14,500 7,520 
November 2005 13,590 7,040 
February 2006 13,310 6,960 
May 2006 15,700 8,340 
August 2006 17,020 8,750 
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Table 2: Discretionary period (variable length) sanctions 
Quarter ending, in which de-
cision was made 
Number of referrals Number of referrals 
which resulted in a sanction
April-May 2000 75,350 18,090 
August 2000 124,530 29,070 
November 2000 127,780 28,480 
February 2001 117,740 28,320 
May 2001 117,160 29,140 
August 2001 122,310 29,990 
November 2001 113,330 28,230 
February 2002 102,750 26,230 
May 2002 114,480 29,700 
August 2002 114,580 30,080 
November 2002 121,200 31,290 
February 2003 106,920 28,480 
May 2003 95,710 26,520 
August 2003 88,410 24,500 
November 2003 89,840 23,890 
February 2004 87,120 23,340 
May 2004 84,470 23,200 
August 2004 82,340 22,120 
November 2004 83,000 21,320 
February 2005 74,130 19,690 
May 2005 76,000 20,620 
August 2005 71,590 19,190 
November 2005 68,770 17,950 
February 2006 61,630 16,000 
May 2006 64,370 16,080 
August 2006 59,790 14,730 
 
 
 
 From Unemployment to Active Jobseeking 75 
 
 
 
References 
Beveridge, W H (1930), Unemployment. A Problem of Industry, London: Longman. 
Beveridge, W H (1942), Social Insurance and Allied Services: Report by Sir William 
Beveridge Cmnd. 217, London: HMSO. 
Buck, T (1996), ‘Jobseeker’s allowance – policy perspectives’, Journal of Social Se-
curity Law, 3, 149-164 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (2004), Pre-Budget Report 2004, London: HM Treasury 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (2007), Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending 
Review, London: HM Treasury 
Clasen, J (1994), Paying the Jobless, Aldershot: Avebury 
Davison, R C (1938), British Unemployment Policy. The Modern Phase since 1930, 
London, Longmans.  
Department for Employment/DSS (1994), Jobseeker’s Allowance, Cm 2687, London: 
HMSO. 
Dorstal, J M (2008), ‘The Workfare Illusion: Re-examining the Concept and the Brit-
ish Case’, Social Policy and Administration, 42(1), 19-42. 
DWP (Department for Work and Pensions) (2006), ‘Work Works’ final evaluation re-
port, DWP Working Paper No 35, Leeds: Corporate Document Services 
DWP (2007a), In Work, Better Off: Next Steps to Full Employment, Cm 7130, Lon-
don: The Stationery Office 
DWP (2007b), Ready for Work: Full Employment in Our Generation, Cm 7290, Lon-
don, The Stationery Office 
DWP (2008a), DWP Commissioning Strategy, Cm 7330, London, The Stationery Of-
fice  
DWP (2008b), Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 Impact Assess-
ment London: DWP 
Fraser, D (1984), The Evolution of the British Welfare State, 2nd edn., London: Mac-
millan 
Freud, D (2007), Reducing dependency, increasing opportunity: options for the future 
of welfare to work, Leeds: Corporate Document Services 
Gilbert, B B (1966), The Origins of National Insurance in Great Britain, London: Mi-
chael Joseph 
Harris, N (1988), ‘Raising the Minimum Age of Entitlement to Income Support: So-
cial Security Act 1988’ Journal of Law & Society 201-215 
Harris, N (1989) Social Security for Young People, Aldershot: Avebury 
76 Neville Harris 
 
 
 
Harris, N (2000), ‘Social Security Prior to Beveridge’, in Harris, N. et al (2000), Social 
Security Law in Context, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 69-86. 
HCPAC (House of Commons Public Accounts Committee) (2007), 56th Report, Job-
centre Plus: Delivering effective services through personal advisers HC 312, Nor-
wich: The Stationery Office 
HCWPC (House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee) (2007), Third Report 
of Session 2006-07, The Government’s Employment Strategy HC 63-I, Norwich: 
The Stationery Office) 
HCWPC (2008), Second Report of Session 2007-08, The best start in life? Alleviating 
deprivation, improving social mobility, and eradicating child poverty, HC 42-I, 
Norwich: The Stationery Office  
HM Government/Department of Social Security (1985), The Reform of Social Secu-
rity, Cmnds. 9517-9519, London: H.M.S.O. 
Ican, S and Basok, T, ‘Community Government: Voluntary Agencies, Social Justice, 
and the Responsibilization of Citizens’ (2004) 8 Citizenship Studies 129. 
Joyce L and Whiting K (2006), Sanctions: Qualitative summary report on lone parent 
customers Working Paper No 27, Leeds: Corporate Document Services 
Kemp, P A and Davidson, J (2007), Routes onto Incapacity Benefit: Findings from a 
survey of recent clients, DWP Research Report 469, Leeds: Corporate Document 
Services 
Knight, T et al (2005), Incapacity Benefit Reforms – The Personal Adviser Role and 
Practices: State 2, DWP Research Report 278, Leeds: Corporate Document Ser-
vices 
Lister, R (2003), ‘Investing in the Citizen-workers of the Future: Transformations in 
Citizenship and the State under New Labour’, Social Policy and Administration, 
37(5), 427-443 
Lund, B (2008), ‘Major, Blair and Third Way in Social Policy’, Social Policy and 
Administration, 42(1), 43-58 
Lundy, L. (2000), ‘From Welfare to Work? Social Security and Unemployment’, in 
Harris, N., Social Security Law in Context, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 291-
325. 
Mesher, J. and Wood, P. (1995) Income-Related Benefits: The Legislation, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell 
Middlemas, J (2006) Jobseekers Allowance Intervention Pilots Quantitative Evalua-
tion, Research Report No 382, Leeds: Corporate Document Services 
Millar, J (2008), ‘Making Work Pay, Making Credits Work: An assessment with spe-
cific reference to lone-parent employment’, International Social Security Review, 
61(2), 21-38 
Peters, M and Joyce, L (2006), A Review of the JSA Sanctions Regime: Summary Re-
search Findings, Leeds: Corporate Document Services  
 From Unemployment to Active Jobseeking 77 
 
 
 
Rahilly, S (2006) ‘Reforming Incapacity benefit to make it fit the welfare to work 
agenda’, Journal of Social Security Law, 13, 191-207 
SSAC (Social Security Advisory Committee) (2006), Nineteenth Report 2006, Leeds: 
Corporate Document Services 
SSAC (2007), In Work, Better Off: Next Steps to Full Employment. Response by the 
Social Security Advisory Committee, London: SSAC 
Webster, P (2008) “Learn more skills or face losing benefit, jobless will be told”, The 
Times, 29 January 
White, S and Cooke, G, Taking Responsibility: A fair welfare contract, London: IPPR  
Wikeley, N (1996), ‘The Jobseekers Act 1995: What the unemployed need is a good 
haircut’, Industrial Law Journal, 25(1), 71-76 
Wikeley, N (2002), The Law of Social Security 5th ed, London: Butterworths Lex-
isNexis 
 
 

